

Financial Research Incentives in Moroccan Public Universities : Insights from a Case Study at Abdelmalek Essadi University.

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Abstract:

Financial incentives, rooted in Principal-Agent Theory, have been increasingly employed to enhance productivity in the private sector. This approach has been extended to the public sector, including universities, to boost academic productivity, particularly in terms of the quantity and quality of published research. In Morocco, this policy has been recently adopted by several universities, including Abdelmalek Essadi University.

This article examines the implementation of financial incentives at Moroccan universities, with a focus on Abdelmalek Essadi University. It details the criteria for allocating incentives, analyzes the characteristics of the institution that received the most awards, and evaluates the quartiles in which these publications were ranked. The study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative analysis of the university's incentive distribution data from 2020 and 2021, with qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews with the Vice President of Abdelmalek Essadi University. Our evaluation suggests that the policy shows promise in boosting research output, particularly in the exact sciences, but requires long-term evaluation to assess its full effectiveness and address challenges in the social sciences.

Keywords: *Financial incentives- Research- Productivity-Public universities-Morocco- Abdelmalek Essadi University*

Résumé:

Les incitations financières sont de plus en plus utilisées pour améliorer la productivité dans le secteur privé, en s'appuyant sur la théorie du principal-agent. Cette approche a été étendue au secteur public, y compris les universités, pour stimuler la productivité académique, en particulier en termes de quantité et de qualité des recherches publiées. Au Maroc, cette politique a récemment été adoptée par plusieurs universités, dont l'Université Abdelmalek Essadi. Cet article examine la mise en œuvre des incitations financières dans les universités marocaines, en se concentrant spécifiquement sur l'Université Abdelmalek Essadi. Il détaille les critères utilisés pour allouer ces incitations, analyse les caractéristiques de l'établissement ayant reçu le plus de récompenses et évalue les quartiles dans lesquels ces publications ont été classées. Cet article adopte une approche méthodologique mixte, combinant l'analyse de données quantitatives avec des insights qualitatifs. La composante quantitative implique un examen des données de distribution des incitations de l'université pour les années 2020 et 2021, tandis que la composante qualitative consiste en un entretien semi-structuré avec la Vice-présidente de l'Université Abdelmalek Essadi. Notre évaluation suggère que la politique d'incitations financières de l'Université Abdelmalek Essadi montre un potentiel prometteur pour augmenter la production de recherches, notamment dans les sciences exactes, mais nécessite une évaluation à long terme pour en évaluer pleinement l'efficacité et résoudre les défis dans les sciences sociales

Mots-clés : Incitations financières - Recherche - Productivité - Universités publiques - Maroc - Université Abdelmalek Essadi

Introduction:

Academic work nowadays has become increasingly demanding. We're not just expected to teach effectively, prepare courses, conduct research to improve and update information, and adapt to new technologies embraced by this generation. There's also growing pressure on university professors to publish—it's a case of 'publish or perish.' Without publications, there is no career advancement, no salary increases. Research is no longer seen as a passion for learning and knowledge dissemination; instead, it's a requirement driven by international pressures from rankings like TIMES or Shanghai.

Many universities in the world have include in their policy financial incentives in order to boost the publication of university professors, particularly the publication of peer-reviewed articles in academic journals that are well ranked.

The application of financial incentives in academia is widely recognized for its potential to enhance research productivity, as evidenced by increased publication rates across various contexts (AlShareef et al., 2023; Andersen & Pallesen, 2008; Levitt & List, 2005). However, these incentives also pose risks to academic freedom, intrinsic motivation, and the overall balance of scholarly activities (Xu, 2020).

According to the logic of the Grounded in Principal-Agent Theory, these incentives are designed to align the interests of the agent (university staff) with those of the principal (the state or funding body), addressing potential conflicts arising from information asymmetry and divergent goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976a, 1976b; Kivisto & Zalyevska, 2015; Shaw & Gupta, 2015; Urbanek, 2020).

Abdelmalek Essadi University (UAE) a Moroccan Public universities, has implemented a structured financial incentive policy aimed at fostering scientific research, with a specific focus on rewarding high-impact publications. This policy, part of the University's development strategy for 2021-2024, reflects a broader trend of performance-based funding in higher education, where research output is increasingly tied to financial rewards.

Given importance of this subject, this article explores how financial incentives are designed at Abdelmalek Essadi University, we will also examine the distributed of these incentives across different establishments within Abdelmalek Essadi University. Specifically, we will examine the allocation criteria, the distribution of incentives among various faculties, and the relative productivity of these faculties in terms of research output.

This study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative data analysis with qualitative insights. The quantitative component involves an examination of the university's incentive distribution data from 2020 and 2021, focusing on the number of publications across different faculties and their respective journal quartiles. This analysis is supplemented by a review of the allocation criteria and incentive amounts across different discipline.

The qualitative component consists of semi-structured interviews with Mrs. Cherkaoui Dekkaki, Vice President of Abdelmalek Essadi University, whose insights will also enrich the analysis of the quantitative data.

1. Literature review:

Financial incentives refer to monetary benefits provided to scholars, university professors, laboratory staff, and faculty in exchange for specific outputs, particularly the publication of peer-reviewed articles in academic journals. Financial rewards are the result of the application of the Principal Agent theory on the university sphere.


The Agency theory is a financial theory, also known as the theory of financial incentives (Holmström, 1999) based on the works of Berle and Means, and later developed in 1976 by two American economists, Jensen and Meckling. According to Berle and Means, there is a separation between shareholders (property rights) and managers (decision rights). The latter are better informed and can therefore exploit information to pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976b). The Agency theory seeks to address the following issue: how can managers be incentivized to work in the interests of shareholders despite the existence of information asymmetry and potentially conflicting interests (Catuogno, S., Berchicci, L., & Magni, 2021). In other words, how can the efficiency of cooperation among individuals within an organization be improved to maximize the common good?

Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract in which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some tasks on their behalf, which involves delegating a certain amount of decision-making authority to the agent. The principal engages the agent to perform services on their behalf, which involves the delegation of decision-making authority and thus a delegation of power in exchange for the service. In other words, the principal transfers a set of their rights to the agent. This transfer of decision-making and execution rights, coupled with the agent's access to a set of private information, gives the agent an advantage over the principal. Indeed, it allows the agent to act less in the interest of the principal and more in their own interest. According to Jensen and Meckling, there

is good reason to believe that the agent does not always act in the principal's best interest. This assertion is valid in cases where there is a conflict of interest. For example, shareholders (the principal) may wish to reduce costs, while managers may seek to increase their own salaries

Within the framework of a profit-maximization hypothesis, it is likely that the agent does not act in the interest of the principal, given that, in some cases, the interests of the two parties are contradictory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976b). For example, if we apply this principle to the relationship between the university, through its staff as the agent, and the State as the principal, the agent's interest would then be to minimize their effort in performing their tasks, namely teaching and research, since their salary is fixed and there are no incentives otherwise (Lazear, 2000). Moreover, the agent is better informed about the nature of the teaching and research functions and their own skills, which makes traditional control by the principal ineffective (Kivisto, 2008; Urbanek, 2020). This has led to the introduction of incentives as a motivation tool and performance indicators as a means of control (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Extent of the difference between the interests of the agent and those of the principal in the presence and absence of financial incentives.



Source: Authors

According to Shaw and Gupta (2015), financial incentives, such as bonuses, are effective in boosting individual performance. However, they can raise concerns about their potential negative impact on intrinsic motivation, which is the natural drive to complete tasks for personal satisfaction rather than for external rewards (Shaw & Gupta, 2015). Shaw & Gupta, 2015 Argues that there is considerable evidence which demonstrates a positive relationship between financial incentives and performance, meaning that when people receive financial rewards, their performance tends to improve their performance (Shaw & Gupta, 2015). (Thibault Landry et

al., 2017) examine the relationship between performance and financial incentives from a psychological perspective, specifically using self-determination theory. Their findings indicate that financial incentives can effectively boost performance if used properly, as they enhance employee motivation by satisfying the needs for competence and autonomy.

AlShareef et al. (2023) examined the impact of financial incentives on academic publications in Saudi universities. Their study revealed that the introduction of these incentives resulted in a significant increase in the number of publications. Specifically, between 2009 and 2019, the number of publications by Saudi universities increased more than seven times (AlShareef et al., 2023).

(Andersen & Pallesen, 2008) studied the impact of financial incentives on the number of publications at Danish universities. The authors examined 162 research institutions, including 17 government institutions. Their study, "this study supports the conclusion that financial incentives can be important," implies that researchers' productivity increases when they perceive those financial incentives are supportive and fair. In other words, researchers are more likely to increase their number of publications if they believe that financial rewards are helpful and aligned with their goals. The study also highlights the risk that such incentives can lead university professors to focus solely on tasks that earn them rewards, potentially neglecting other important aspects of their job, such as teaching and administrative responsibilities (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). (Schneijderberg et al., 2022) conducted a longitudinal study spanning 25 years to investigate the evolution of academic publication behaviour across various disciplines in Germany. Their research revealed that the proportion of peer-reviewed contributions is significantly and positively correlated with the extent of organizational performance-based funding. This finding underscores the impact of financial incentives, as performance-based funding heavily relies on such incentives to influence academic output. In addition to enhancing productivity, some studies indicate that financial incentives can affect scholars' freedom. For example, a study involving 65 interviews with academics in the humanities and social sciences at six Chinese universities explored the impact of financial incentives on publication. The findings suggest that incentives imposed by administrators can undermine academic autonomy, potentially limiting scholars' freedom to choose their research topics. Moreover, the study highlights the complexity of the relationship between incentives and outcomes, indicating that the effects are not necessarily positive or negative (Xu, 2020). The authors also note that these incentive policies have increased


academics' accountability to their organizations, aligning with the principles of New Public Management (Xu, 2020).

In summary, financial incentives in academia, grounded in Principle-Agent Theory, have been shown to significantly impact scholarly productivity, as evidenced by increased publication rates across various contexts. However, these incentives also pose risks to academic freedom and the intrinsic motivation of scholars. The complex relationship between incentives and academic outcomes suggests that while financial rewards can be effective, they must be carefully designed and implemented to avoid unintended consequences. Given this context, it is crucial to understand how financial incentives are designed in Abdelmalek Essadi university? and How they are distributed across different establishments within the University? What are the most productive establishment in quantity and particularly since some establishments demonstrate higher productivity than others? How are these incentives allocated faculties?

2. Financial incentives At Abdelmalek Essadi University

Abdelmalek Essaâdi University was established by Dahir No. 189-144, dated October 23, 1989, in Tétouan. The university comprises 17 institutions distributed across five cities in the region: Tétouan, Tangier, Larache, Ksar El Kebir, and Al Hoceima¹. The evolution of scientific production in the UAE from 2013 to 2022 demonstrates a significant upward trend, culminating in a peak in 2022. The number of publications indexed in Scopus increased from 151 in 2013 to 884 in 2022, reflecting a growth of 485%.

Figure 2: The evolution of scientific production at Abdelmalek Essadi University



Source: The Moroccan Barometre²

¹ <https://www.uae.ac.ma/histoire> (consulted 18 August 2024)

² https://barometre.cnrst.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=107 (Consulted 18 August 2024)

The publication incentive policy at UAE University was instituted following University Council Decision No. 13 of 2021 (refer to Appendix). This policy is an integral component of the University's development strategy for 2021-2024. The decision was formally adopted by the University Council on October 26, 2021, subsequent to the Scientific Research Commission's recommendation on July 16, 2021. In line with this directive, the University will allocate a designated annual budget for research incentives, sourced from its overall financial resources, to foster scientific research. This initiative reflects Abdelmalek Essadi University's strategic focus on supporting scientific research through allocated incentives. The policy aims to provide financial resources to encourage research output and align with the University's overall development strategy. The provision of these incentives is intended to support research activities and contribute to the University's goals of enhancing its research profile and productivity.

The allocation of the budget for scientific research is governed by the following criteria:

- 5% designated for innovation and patents
- 2% allocated to publications in Web of Science and Nature journals
- 13% assigned to citations, with a further breakdown of 80% for Web of Science and Scopus citations, and 20% for citations in other databases

An examination of the budget allocation for scientific research indicates a predominant emphasis on citations. This allocation strategy suggests that Abdelmalek Essadi University prioritizes the impact and quality of research outputs as opposed to the sheer volume of publications. The allocation pattern reflects a policy orientation towards enhancing the visibility and academic influence of the University's research activities.

3. The Procedure for Granting the Incentive

According to Mrs. Cherkaoui Dekkaki, Vice President of Abdelmalek Essadi University and Scientific Research Officer, the procedure for granting research incentives is conducted through a biennial call issued by the University. The initial call was announced at the end of 2022 and pertained to publications from the years 2020 and 2021.

The University has established a dedicated online platform where faculty members can submit their publications within a designated timeframe. Following the submission period, the allocation of incentives is governed by the following criteria:

1. The incentive amount is contingent upon the journal's ranking according to SCIMAGO, which categorizes journals into quartiles based on their scientific impact.
2. The incentive amount is also influenced by the specific academic discipline of the publication.

This procedure underscores the University's commitment to recognizing and rewarding high-impact research based on established academic metrics.

Table 1: Incentives for Exact Sciences, Engineering Sciences, and Health Sciences

Quartile	Incentive (relative to Q4)
Q1	$2.0 \times Q4$
Q2	$1.6 \times Q4$
Q3	$1.2 \times Q4$
Q4	$1.0 \times Q4$

Source: Resolution No. 13/2021 on Publication Incentives

As for incentives for the fields of legal, economic, social sciences, and education, they are awarded according to the following criteria:

Table 2: Incentives for Legal, Economic, Social Sciences, and Education

Quartile	Incentive (relative to Q4)
Q1	$2.4 \times Q4$
Q2	$2.0 \times Q4$
Q3	$1.4 \times Q4$
Q4	$1.2 \times Q4$

Source: Resolution No. 13/2021 on Publication Incentives

The allocation of funds for exact sciences, engineering, and health, designated under the code "Q4," is subject to annual adjustments deliberated by the University. This flexibility is designed to accommodate budgetary fluctuations, shifts in institutional objectives, and evolving priorities

in scientific research. Such adaptability enables university officials to manage resources more effectively.

A fixed allocation of 2% of the budget is earmarked specifically for publications in journals indexed in Web of Science and Nature. Each article published in these journals receives an incentive of 40,000 DH (Moroccan dirhams) if the budget is underutilized. The remaining funds are allocated to publications indexed in Scopus.

Incentives are awarded to eligible individuals—permanent professors affiliated with Abdelmalek Essadi University—through their respective research structures. According to Mrs. Cherkaoui Dekkaki, legal restrictions in Morocco preclude the use of nominal checks for these payments. Instead, funds must be used for research-related purposes, such as travel, conducting research, and purchasing equipment.

It is worth noting that legal payment restrictions may limit the effectiveness of the incentive procedure. For comparison, countries such as China employ more direct payment methods, which may have a greater impact. The first cycle of incentive distribution occurred in 2022 and was aimed at rewarding articles published in 2020 and 2021. During this cycle, Abdelmalek Essadi University distributed incentives to a total of 716 articles. The distribution, according to institutions and journal rankings, was as follows:

The Faculty of Exact Sciences received the highest number of awards, with a total of 257 articles. This includes 103 articles from 2020 and 154 articles from 2021, marking a significant 50% increase in publications compared to the previous year.

Table 3: Awarded Articles from 2020 and 2021 by Institutions and Quartiles

Institution	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total
National School of Applied Sciences of Tétouan	13	11	10	4	38
Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan (1st mention)	62	66	79	40	257
Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan (2nd mention)	7	7	6	5	26
Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences of Tétouan	4	3	0	0	8
Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy of Tangier	2	3	2	2	9
Faculty of Sciences and Techniques of Tangier	77	65	24	50	216

Multidisciplinary Faculty of Larache	4	14	7	7	32
National School of Applied Sciences of Tangier	16	14	16	5	51
Faculty of Sciences and Techniques of Al Hoceima	5	13	18	5	41
National School of Applied Sciences of Al Hoceima	13	11	11	2	37
Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences of Tangier	0	0	1	0	1
Total					716

Sources: Compiled by us from data provided by the Vice President of UAE

The comparative analysis of the institutions reveals that the Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan demonstrates a preeminence in research output, ranking first with a cumulative total of 257 published articles. This achievement is delineated by the distribution of articles across journal quartiles: 62 articles are indexed in Q1, 66 in Q2, 79 in Q3, and 40 in Q4.

Table 4: Ranking of Institutions by Number of Awarded Articles

Institution	Total	Ranking
Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan	257	1
Faculty of Sciences and Techniques of Tangier	216	2
National School of Applied Sciences of Tangier	51	3
Faculty of Sciences and Techniques of Al Hoceima	41	4
National School of Applied Sciences of Tétouan	38	5
National School of Applied Sciences of Al Hoceima	37	6
Multidisciplinary Faculty of Larache	32	7
Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan (second mention)	26	8
Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy of Tangier	9	9
Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences of Tétouan	8	10
Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences of Tangier	1	11
Total	716	

Sources: Compiled by us from data provided by the Vice President of UAE

In second place, the Faculty of Sciences and Techniques of Tangier exhibits a notable performance with a total of 216 awarded articles. The distribution of these articles is as follows: 77 are indexed in Q1, 65 in Q2, 24 in Q3, and 50 in Q4.

In third place, the National School of Applied Sciences of Tangier recorded a total of 51 awarded articles, with 16 indexed in Q1, 14 in Q2, 16 in Q3, and five in Q4. The Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences ranks last, with only one awarded publication indexed in Q3.

This analysis underscores that within Abdelmalek Essadi University, the majority of awarded publications are concentrated in the fields of exact sciences. It is evident that researchers within these disciplines are the primary beneficiaries of the university's incentive program.

This observation suggests that, despite the higher incentives allocated to the social sciences (as indicated in the table), these incentives may be insufficient to enhance both the quality and quantity of publications in these fields. However, it is crucial to recognize that a scientifically valid evaluation of the effectiveness of these incentives necessitates a longer period of implementation. This is particularly pertinent given the consensus among researchers that publishing in the social sciences is inherently more complex compared to the exact sciences (Easley et al., 2000), Easley and Madden (Easley et al., 2000) report that the acceptance rate for manuscripts in the exact sciences ranges between 76% and 80%, whereas it is considerably lower, between 20% and 25%, in the social sciences.

The challenge of providing adequate incentives for social sciences is not unique to Abdelmalek Essadi University. For instance, Mohammed V University offers a premium of 11,000 DH for Q1 indexed publications in the social sciences, whereas the premium for publications in the exact sciences is 9,000 DH. This disparity highlights a broader issue of incentive imbalance across disciplines. It may also signal an institutional effort to encourage greater productivity among social science scholars, given the inherent difficulties associated with publishing in these fields.

Table 5: Comparison of Publication Bonus Policies among Different Moroccan Universities

University	Establishment Date	Amount
Hassan II University of Casablanca	2020	From 6000 to 50,000 DH
Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University	2018	From 5000 to 50,000 DH
Mohammed V University	2020	From 5000 to 50,000 DH
Moulay Ismail University	2022	The reference amount changes annually
Abdelmalek Essaadi University	2021	The reference amount changes annually

Source: Compiled by us from various university council decisions

The policy of promoting scientific research through publication bonuses appears to be relatively recent in Morocco. Based on the decisions reviewed, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University was the pioneer in implementing this policy, with other universities adopting similar measures in 2020, 2021, and as recently as 2022.

This timing indicates that a comprehensive evaluation of such policies at the national level will require a medium- to long-term approach to accurately assess their effectiveness. Transparency regarding the allocation of publication bonuses is essential for conducting thorough evaluations. However, our inquiries with several universities reveal a current lack of transparency in this regard.

The amounts allocated for publication bonuses are generally comparable among universities that have adopted these policies, typically ranging from 5,000 DH to 50,000 DH. These amounts vary based on the indexing of the publication and the reference database (e.g., Elsevier, Nature, Scopus).

Nonetheless, some institutions, such as Abdelmalek Essaadi University and Moulay Ismail University, have implemented adjustable bonus amounts. This approach allows for a fixed bonus scale (see table) with a multiplier factor that can fluctuate annually. According to the

Vice President of Abdelmalek Essaadi University, this adjustable policy provides the university with the flexibility to align the bonuses with its evolving objectives.

However, it is posited that adjustable bonuses may have a limited impact on researchers' productivity. For example, if a university reduces the bonus amounts, researchers may feel demotivated, while an increase could potentially enhance their productivity.

Regarding the distribution of bonuses, some universities, such as Abdelmalek Essaadi University, permit the direct use of bonuses by researchers for research-related needs. In contrast, other institutions, such as Moulay Ismail University, allocate bonuses to research laboratories, which then utilize these funds for their operational requirements. This practice appears to diverge from the primary objective of stimulating scientific output by incentivizing individual researchers, as outlined in university policies. Ideally, the awarding of bonuses might be more motivating if the majority, if not the entirety, of the bonus were allocated to the individual responsible for the publication. In this context, individuals within a research group who have not actively contributed or have published infrequently still benefit from the bonuses.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that publication bonuses are exclusively awarded to permanent faculty members, thereby excluding doctoral students and associate researchers. This exclusion seems unjust, considering that many scientific publications are a result of the work conducted by doctoral students.

In conclusion, while the publication bonus policy is a commendable initiative aimed at encouraging scientific production, there is room for refinement. A more effective approach might be achieved through a thorough evaluation of its impact and the incorporation of adjustments to better align with the intended objectives.

Conclusion:

The financial incentives policy is shaped by New Public Management principles, which apply private sector mechanisms to the public sector, and Principal-Agent Theory, which seeks to align the interests of the State (the principal) with those of university professors (the agents) by utilizing financial incentives to enhance research productivity.

The financial incentives policy at Abdelmalek Essadi University (UAE) focuses on high-impact publications, demonstrating a clear commitment to fostering scientific excellence. The university's emphasis on citations and journal rankings, along with a differentiated incentive structure across disciplines, highlights a nuanced understanding of the diverse challenges and opportunities within various fields of study.

The data we presented shows that exact sciences benefit more from these incentives, while social sciences face difficulties in taking advantage of them due to lower publication numbers in this field. Additionally, the inability to reward individual authors personally may reduce the motivational impact of these incentives. It might be beneficial to allocate a percentage to the laboratory and a percentage among the authors to address this issue.

However, it should be noted that this introduction has the potential to significantly enhance scientific publications at Abdelmalek Essadi University(UAE). To validate this hypothesis, a study should be conducted over the medium and long term, once data becomes available, considering that the initiative is relatively recent.

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List of Acronyms:

NPM :New Public Management

UAE :Abdelmalek Essadi University

TIMES :Times Higher Education Rankings

Appendix:



**التحفيز الخاص بإنتاج المنشورات العلمية المصنفة
وبراءات الاختراع وبالاستشهادات
قرار رقم 13 / 2021
المنشورات العلمية المصنفة**

استنادا على التوجهات الملكية السامية والتوجه العام للدولة الرامي إلى تشجيع البحث العلمي من خلال تعزيز النصوص التشريعية والمؤسسات الساهرة عليه؛

وبناء على القانون رقم 01.00 المتعلق بتنظيم التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي؛

وتحقيقاً للأهداف المنصوص عليها في القانون-الإطار رقم 51.17 المتعلق بمنظومة التربية والتكوين والبحث العلمي والهادفة إلى تنميته وتطويره والنهوض به، وتثمينه والرفع من مردوديته، وربطه بأهداف التنمية الشاملة؛

وتنزيلاً للتدابير المقترحة ضمن مشروع تطوير جامعة عبد الملك السعدي 2021-2024، وتعزيزاً لمكانة أحسن للجامعة على المستوى الدولي والوطني،

وتبعاً لمصادقة مجلس الجامعة المنعقد بتاريخ 26 أكتوبر 2021 على القرارات المؤرخة في 16 يوليوز 2021 للجنة البحث العلمي والتعاون المنبثقة عن مجلس الجامعة.

تقرر جامعة عبد الملك السعدي بتطوان، اعتماد تدابير جديدة لتحفيز الإنتاج العلمي قصد تشجيع الباحثين الجامعيين على تعزيز هذا الجانب. وقد خصصت لهذا الغرض ميزانية سنوية لتشجيع البحث العلمي موزعة كالتالي :

5% للابتكار- براءة اختراع و2% للمنشورات في مجلات Nature أو Science و13% للاستشهادات (Citations) المتعلقة بالمنشورات المفهرسة في قاعدة المعطيات العلمية « Scopus » أو « Web of Science » و80% للمنشورات المفهرسة في قاعدة المعطيات العلمية « Scopus » أو « Web of Science ».

تعرض مسطرة مكافأة المنشورات العلمية وفق الشروط التالية:

- ترصد جامعة عبد الملك السعدي دعم مالي لكل مقال نشره أساتذة الجامعة في مجلة مصنفة في قاعدة المعطيات العلمية « Scopus » أو « Web of Science ». ويختلف قدر الدعم حسب صنف المجلة بالرجوع إلى مكانتها في التصنيف الأخير الذي تقوم به مؤسسة «SCIMAGO» للمجلات العلمية كل سنة وكذلك حسب الحقل المعرفي.
- يتم احتساب المبلغ المخصص لكل صنف من المجلات وفقاً للمبلغ المخصص للربع Q4 (المخصص للحقول المعرفية في العلوم الحقة والهندسة وعلوم الصحة) وفقاً لمعاملات الترجيح الواردة في الجداول التالية :



العلوم الحقة والهندسة وعلوم الصحة

معامل الترجيح	ترتيب المجلات
2.0 X Q4	Q 1
1.6 X Q4	Q 2
1.2 X Q4	Q 3
1.0 X Q4	Q 4

احتسب معامل الترجيح المشار إليه اعلاه بالاعتماد على أساس مبلغ Q4 المثبت والمخصص للحقول المعرفية في العلوم الحقة والهندسة وعلوم الصحة

العلوم القانونية والاقتصادية والإنسانية والاجتماعية والتربية

معامل الترجيح	ترتيب المجلات
2.4 X Q 4	Q1
2.0 X Q 4	Q 2
1.4 X Q 4	Q 3
1.2 X Q 4	Q 4

احتسب معامل الترجيح المشار إليه اعلاه بالاعتماد على أساس مبلغ Q4 المثبت والمخصص للحقول المعرفية في العلوم الحقة والهندسة وعلوم الصحة

كما يتم احتساب المبلغ المخصص لكل مقال على أساس الميزانية المخصصة لكل سنة لتشجيع المنشورات العلمية والعدد الإجمالي لجميع المقالات المنشورة للسنة (N-1) بحيث يتوافق (N) مع السنة التي يتم فيها منح المكافأة.

كما تخصص جامعة عبد المالك السعدي نسبة 2% من الميزانية السنوية لتشجيع البحث العلمي لتشجيع النشر في مجلتي Science أو Nature حيث اعتمد دعم قدره 40000 درهم لكل مقال منشور. وفي حالة عدم الاستهلاك الكامل للميزانية المخولة للنشر في هاتين المجلتين، تفرغ هذه الميزانية في باب الدعم المخول لفئة المنشورات العلمية المفهرسة في قاعدة المعطيات العلمية « Scopus » أو « Web of Science ».

للاستفادة من هذه المكافأة :

- يجب صياغة الصفة الرسمية الخاصة بالانتماء لجامعة عبد المالك السعدي بتطوان في كل منشور علمي وأكاديمي بشكل صحيح وواضح، وفقا للطريقة المتفق عليها والمحددة أدناه كيفما كانت لغة النشر مع التأكيد بالإشارة إلى اسم مؤسسة الإنتماء المختصر (Acronyme) والمتفق حوله والوارد ضمن جدول اختصار أسماء المؤسسات المرفق لهذا القرار :

Intitulé ou Acronyme de la structure de recherche, Acronyme de l'Etablissement, Abdelmalek Essadi University, Tetouan, Morocco

- يسحب مطبوع طلب للاستفادة من مكافأة التحفيز، من موقع الجامعة الرسمي www.uae.ma، لتعبئته من طرف الأستاذ الباحث حامل طلب المكافأة والعضو في إحدى بنيات البحث العلمي المعتمدة؛
- تخضع طلبات مكافأة النشر للدراسة من طرف لجنة منبثقة عن لجنة البحث العلمي والتعاون لجامعة عبد المالك السعدي بتطوان؛
- تمنح المكافأة لفائدة الأستاذ الباحث حامل طلب المكافأة عن طريق بنية البحث المنتسب إليها؛
- يستفيد كل منشور علمي من مكافأة التحفيز على مستوى الجامعة مرة واحدة مهما تعددت بنية البحث المشتركة في إنجاز هذا المنشور العلمي؛